This article follows on from work on content industries (Mi\u00e8ge, 2017), audiovisual regulation (de la Brosse, 2013) and avenues of research into online television (Lotz, Lobato and Thomas, 2018; Eriksson and Fitzgerald, 2019). Certainly, research has addressed issues of diversity of media expression with old-established media and even with a digital dimension, but it has rarely tackled online TV on the terrain of sub-Saharan Africa. In this region, three countries have recently adopted new laws integrating digital publications: Benin, Senegal and C\u00f4te d'Ivoire. These countries have regulatory bodies a priori<\/em> to guarantee the diversity of media and cultural expression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The article first places the issue of online television in its political and geopolitical context, to show the internal and external factors that limit the diversity of their content in Africa. It then proceeds to a summary analysis of the regulations in force in the selected countries to see to what extent they guarantee a diversity of media and cultural expressions. To this last end, the article explores a corpus of online media, made up of national public television channels, as well as private television channels and web TVs with the largest audiences on YouTube. This exploratory examination makes it possible to grasp the diversity of online television media content, particularly from a thematic, linguistic, religious and ethnic point of view.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the outset, it's worth clarifying the three key notions of this article's theme. Online television refers both to digital versions of existing channels on terrestrial frequencies and to television exclusively available online (Aymar, 2018). Cultural diversity is seen as \u00abthe multiplicity of ways in which the cultures of social groups and societies find expression\u00bb (Unesco, 2005). Regulation concerns \u00aball the legal or technical processes by which the behavior of the various actors acting in the network is maintained and adjusted in conformity with rules or standards (Arnaud, 1993, p. 521).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Taking into account the national, regional and international perspectives of online television in Africa calls for a geopolitical and postcolonial analysis of international media. Such an exercise involves assessing \u00abtrends in traffic and coverage<\/em> of information on a hegemonic prism, explaining imbalances in media coverage by a set of ideological practices that are at once a reflection of the constructive elements of the world system which, in turn, is structured by the forces of international politics and economics\u00bb.\u00bb<\/em> (Brin and Greenberg, 2017, p. 5). This theoretical posture explaining the informational imbalance in North-South relations recalls the controversies over the New World Information and Communication Order (Nomic) for which Unesco was the forum in the 1970s. The question of diversity in online television offerings must be situated, on an international scale, in the global geography of journalism (Marthoz, 2012, p. 19), concentrating Western media at the center of the global information system as producers, and media from developing countries on the periphery of this system as mere consumers. However, this critical perspective on cultural domination will be qualified later by that of national information control policies, which also affect cultural diversity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The international media rush to Africa since the 2000s has put the Nomic debate back on the agenda. Africa has become a media-rich continent. French television channels and groups, in particular, dominate the landscape of the French-speaking world as one of the markers of the neo-colonial relations referred to as Fran\u00e7afrique (Blamangin, 2019): at the top of the list, the channels France 24<\/em> (the leading international news channel in the Maghreb and French-speaking Africa, with a viewership of over 82% among executives and managers), TV5 Afrique and Canal+ Afrique. Of all the international and pan-African TV channels, the most-watched in the zone outside the news offer are mainly foreign or foreign-owned entertainment channels: A+, Nollywood TV, Novelas TV, Nina Novelas, Trace Africa and others.[1]<\/a>. The results of the 2016 Africascope study already showed a worrying media landscape in French-speaking Africa: the share of national channels was just 15% in Gabon, 29% in Cameroon, 35% in C\u00f4te d'Ivoire and Mali. Conversely, in the DRC, Burkina Faso and Senegal, where local supply is very high, the study reported that this share exceeded 50% (57%, 60% and 70% respectively). Local production capacity therefore determines local media consumption. The 2019 Africascope results, covering 11 French-speaking African countries, show that 92% of Africans surveyed watch television on a daily basis, on average for almost four hours (3h56). Television is therefore a major issue in Africa as a sensitive sector of cultural sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The switchover of terrestrial television broadcasting from analog to digital poses another challenge for cultural sovereignty and the promotion of diversity in Africa. Digital terrestrial television (DTT) offers many technological advantages, but also geopolitical disadvantages for African countries.[2]<\/a>. The switchover from analog to digital generates a strategically important digital dividend for governments, by making available frequencies that were previously allocated by channel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet African broadcasting regulatory authorities are already struggling to ensure compliance with specifications for the distribution of terrestrial channels and satellite bouquet services. The question then arises as to how they can ensure their countries\u00ab cultural sovereignty in a context of digital development where national program production capacities are very low, if not virtually non-existent. Under these conditions, it is feared that Africans will be locked into foreign television consumption offers, disconnecting them from their local cultures and realities. Without adequate supervision, DTT will turn Africans into passive consumers of mass cultures from elsewhere, creating what Marcuse calls the \u00bbuniverse of closed discourse\" and social control through technology (Marcuse, 1968). Added to this external domination limiting diversity are the regulatory constraints exerted by African leaders themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An examination of the regulations governing the digital audiovisual landscape in three French-speaking West African countries (Benin, C\u00f4te d'Ivoire and Senegal) reveals a certain awareness of diversity, but also a lack of strategic orientation with regard to the geopolitical stakes of digital television, and of political will to promote the diversity of cultural expression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In \u00abLoi no 2015-07 du 20 mars 2015 portant Code de l'information et de la communication en R\u00e9publique du B\u00e9nin\u00bb, the Beninese legislator devotes specific provisions to online television services. Article 252 of this law stipulates that. \u00abThe direct or indirect operation in the Republic of Benin, whether free of charge or in return for payment, of an Internet site providing audiovisual communication and written press services intended for the public is subject to authorization by the Haute autorit\u00e9 de l'audiovisuel et de la communication [HAAC]. However, the creation or running of blogs is not subject to any prior authorization.\u2019<\/em>, This definition includes web TV and other online media. Noting the \u00aball-out creation of online media without [its] prior authorization\u00bb, Benin's HAAC relies on the provisions of article 252 to order \u00abthe promoters of all these online media to put an end to all publication without delay, under pain of seeing the sanctions provided for by the texts in force applied\u00bb (HAAC press release, July 7, 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Benin's legislators and regulators are more concerned with the threats posed by online media than with the opportunities they offer in terms of diversity, cultural sovereignty and geopolitical balance. The various press laws adopted since the advent of democratic renewal in Benin are more dominated by internal repression than geopolitical and geostrategic considerations. Nor is \u00abLaw n\u00b0 2017-20 of April 20, 2018 on the digital code in the Republic of Benin\u00bb a text for international positioning on a strategic issue. It entrusts the Minister in charge of Electronic Communications with overseeing policies to increase access to the Internet and broadband services, reflecting \u00abthe diversity of cultures, languages and social interests\u00bb (article 95). However, the code is limited to the organization of the sector and the repression of digital infractions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new Press Code adopted by Senegal (\u00abLoi no 2017-27 du 13 juillet 2017 portant Code de la presse\u00bb) displays the same repressive tendency as Benin in its provisions relating to online press companies. The online press is not to be confused with electronic communication and is therefore excluded from the scope of \u00abLoi no 2018-28 du 12 d\u00e9cembre 2018 portant Code des communications \u00e9lectroniques\u00bb in Senegal (article 2). Unlike communication services, the online press company must publish its online content professionally; it must employ at least three journalists on a regular basis; it must have a publication director and an editor-in-chief with ten and seven years' experience respectively. In any case, online public communication services whose main purpose is the dissemination of advertising messages or announcements, in any form whatsoever, cannot be recognized as online press services (article 178 of the Press Code).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Senegalese legislator's definition of online audiovisual services is therefore much more precise than that of its Beninese counterpart, as outlined above. However, the professionalism of Senegal's online press companies goes hand in hand with a sense of responsibility on the part of professionals and access providers. The law obliges them to set up moderation systems for the personal contribution spaces of Internet users, and to have editorial control over them (article 179). They are criminally or civilly liable for the content of their sites, if they fail to act with diligence (article 181). They are required to keep data enabling the identification of any person having contributed to the creation of their content (article 182). In view of these onerous obligations on online press companies, the international press freedom organization, article 19, \u00abdenounces the adoption of a regressive press code and calls on the President of the Republic [of Senegal] not to promulgate the code\u00bb.[3]<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to its repressive dimensions, Senegal's Press Code expresses a certain concern for diversity. In the explanatory memorandum to the law, the legislator stresses his aim to \u00abpromote the production and development of quality information, programs and services contributing to the education, cultural, scientific, moral, social and economic development of citizens\u00bb, including \u00abthe opening up of regions and localities\u00bb.\u00bb<\/em>. It remains to be seen how this diversity can be ensured in the content of online press companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Senegal also formulates its objectives of sovereignty and geopolitical control of the online press more clearly than Benin. According to article 178 of the Press Code, an online press company must meet a certain number of obligations. Its capital must be held by one or more Senegalese nationals for a minimum of 51%; a foreign natural or legal person may not hold more than 20%; and its access provider must be Senegalese and have its head office in Senegal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n C\u00f4te d'Ivoire's \u00abLoi no 2017-867 du 27 d\u00e9cembre 2017 portant r\u00e9gime juridique de la presse\u00bb joins Senegal's Press Code on several points. Its definition of press enterprise is similar to the definition of online press enterprise in Senegal. Indeed, it includes the \u00abproduction of digital information\u00bb, understood as \u00abany online public communication service published on a professional basis by a natural or legal person who has editorial control over its content, consisting of the production and provision to the public of original content, of general interest, renewed regularly, composed of information related to current events and having been the subject of journalistic processing,<\/em> which does not constitute a promotional tool or an accessory to an industrial or commercial activity\u00bb.\u00bb<\/em> (article 1). All publications, including online news productions, must be run mainly by professional journalists, in particular the publication director, the editor-in-chief and his\/her deputy, and the majority of the editorial team. The Ivorian legislator has taken the professionalization of the online press a step further, by requiring that the press enterprise be set up as a commercial company in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Act of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) on the law governing commercial companies and economic interest groups (article 6).<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, unlike Benin, where the online press, including web TV, is subject to prior authorization by the Haute Autorit\u00e9 de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC), the publication of any digital news production in C\u00f4te d'Ivoire is only subject to a written declaration to the competent public prosecutor (article 15).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ivorian law also differs significantly from the laws of Benin and Senegal in terms of the penalties applicable to offences or failure to comply with the obligations incumbent on digital information providers: it excludes \u00abpolice custody, preventive detention and imprisonment\u00bb \u00abfor offences committed through the press or any other means of publication\u00bb (article 89), including the offence of insulting the President of the Republic (article 91). All other offences are punishable by fines only.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Lastly, Ivorian law contains no express provisions guaranteeing diversity in the online press. On the other hand, it limits foreign ownership of the press company by requiring that at least the majority of its share capital be held by Ivorian associates, shareholders or limited partners (article 6), with no possibility of using a nominee (article 7) or non-registered shares (article 6).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The legislative provisions examined do not appear to be sufficient to meet the geopolitical and geo-economic challenges of the digital press, and online television in particular. It remains to be seen whether they will at least result in a certain diversity in the content of online television media in Benin, C\u00f4te d'Ivoire and Senegal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In order to gain a better understanding of the impact of public policy and regulation on the cultural diversity of online television, it would seem appropriate to first map out the audiovisual landscape of the three African countries studied. This exercise reveals four types of online TV: web extensions of terrestrial channels, web TVs attached to news portals, web TVs broadcasting production company series and programs, and web TVs present exclusively on the Internet. These four types can be broken down into generalist, local and regional sub-categories, people,<\/em> nuns, etc.<\/em> Taking an exploratory approach to televisual diversity, a corpus of nine online television services was compiled, including three per country (one public, one private and one exclusively online). For Senegal, these were Radio T\u00e9l\u00e9vision du S\u00e9n\u00e9gal (RTS<\/em>), T\u00e9l\u00e9 Futur M\u00e9dia (TFM<\/em>) and the YouTube channel Dakaractu TV. For Benin, the choice fell on the Office de radiodiffusion et t\u00e9l\u00e9vision du B\u00e9nin (ORTB), the private channel Golfe TV and the portal Benin web TV. Radiot\u00e9l\u00e9vision ivoirienne (RTI), the YouTube channel Abidjan net TV and Nouvelle Cha\u00eene ivoirienne (NCI) complete the corpus. A sample of content from these channels was captured from June 10 to July 10, 2020. Specifically, for each, the 50 most recent videos and the 30 oldest publications accessible via the YouTube channel (some dating back more than nine years). This corpus was analyzed according to four of the diversity indicators defined by the African Media Barometer<\/em> (BMA) published by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation[4]<\/a> variety of themes, linguistic diversity, religious diversity and the reflection of ethnic minority voices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As highlighted above, public policies to progressively liberalize the television sector since the 1990s, combined with the program to switch from analog to digital television since 2015, have strengthened television pluralism in French-speaking Africa. However, developments in television differ from one country to another, and exact data on the number of channels in operation remains scarcely available or not updated by the regulatory authorities supposed to oversee this sector, with the exception of C\u00f4te d'Ivoire's Haute autorit\u00e9 de la communication audiovisuelle (Haca).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Senegal's broadcasting monopoly came to an end in the 2000s, with the launch of the first private channel, 2STV, initially under a concession contract with public broadcaster RTS, before becoming independent in 2006. Since then, the television sector has expanded considerably, with 31 channels operating on 147 channels allocated by the Senegalese Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (ARTP). But in reality, some 20 channels are available on the DTT bouquet: Walf TV, RDV, TFM, SEN TV, 7TV, ITV, DTV, Mourchid TV, Al Mouridiya TV, Lamp Fall TV, Touba TV, 2SI, L'OBS TV, Canal \u00e9ducation, Tivaouane TV, Asfiyah TV, TMS S\u00e9n\u00e9gal. This is an artificial audiovisual pluralism, insofar as licenses have been awarded to groups that often already own TV channels with no content. In terms of programming, each channel tries to offer a specific editorial line: politics\/counter-power (WalfTV), culture (2sTV), entertainment (TFM), religion (Mourchid TV, Lamp Fall TV). However, the weekly schedule is almost identical from one channel to the next, even if there is some diversity throughout the programming: sport (Monday), drama (Tuesday), politics (Wednesday), religion (Thursday), talkshow (Friday), entertainment (Saturday) and wrestling, which is a national sport, (Sunday). The same applies to morning and political shows, which adopt similar concepts and formats. Paradoxically, more competition leads to less diversity, as Sonnac and Gabszewicz (2013) argue. In Senegal, there is a \u00ablinguistic standardization due to the hegemony of the Wolof language\u00bb (FES, 2013). The public broadcaster includes all eight recognized national languages in its programming. However, the Pulaar language seems to be favored, with specific programs on the following TV channels mainstream<\/em> while ethnic groups remain completely marginalized. In view of these practices, it seems difficult to assert that television pluralism rhymes with diversity of expression. However, the positioning of national films and series on commercial channels in particular (TFM broadcasts virtually no foreign films) is a step forward that could guarantee cultural sovereignty in the long term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Benin's online audiovisual landscape boasts a dozen TV channels, including three public service channels: ORTB, B\u00e9nin Business 24 (BB24) and ADO TV; and seven private channels: Canal 3, Golfe TV, E-T\u00e9l\u00e9, EDEN TV and Carrefour TV. In terms of content, these channels focus on politics, economics, the environment, society and health. ADO TV is dedicated to youth and education. BB24, dedicated to promoting entrepreneurship and the economic development of Benin, has succeeded in diversifying its magazines in the fields of economics, culture and politics, etc.<\/em> (FES, 2014) and to record the majority of available videos (over 2000) on the ORTB group's YouTube channel. ADO TV is under the supervision of the Ministry of Sports and Leisure, with a focus on youth and education. ORTB presents the \u00abWonders of Benin\u00bb, through its program \u00abNo pinden\u00bb. In Benin, only a few channels try to promote the main local languages Fon, Yoruba, Mina and Dendi. Voodoo celebrations receive media coverage on a par with Catholic pilgrimages. The same treatment is reserved for events linked to the Muslim religion (FES, 2014).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In C\u00f4te d'Ivoire, liberalization of the audiovisual sector came later in 2019. As part of the digital terrestrial television (DTT) operationalization agenda, public television was allocated three channels (RTI 1, RTI 2 and RTI Bouak\u00e9). Four private channels have been authorized to broadcast, three of which are already in operation: A+ Ivoire (part of the Canal Horizons group), NCI, Life TV and Infos7 (not yet operational). Apart from news programmes (JT), RTI 1 and RTI 2 programmes are essentially entertainment programmes. (\u00abC'midi\u00bb, \u00abMatin Bonheur\u00bb, \u00abMadame, Monsieur, Bonsoir\u00bb) and try to reflect the diversity of cultural expressions. Special programs promote the Ivorian regions and Africa (Info r\u00e9gionale, Made in Africa); A+ Ivoire has positioned itself in fiction, broadcasting \u00ablocal\u00bb series and films. NCI, with its generalist positioning, focuses on talk shows<\/em> and live<\/em> with the stars, as well as programs with \u00abordinary\u00bb people. Life TV, launched very recently, focuses on offbeat entertainment and information (see Jeune Afrique,<\/em> of June 26, 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In all three countries, the web extensions of terrestrial channels represent the first wave of online television. Almost all of them have You-Tube channels with interesting view statistics as of July 10, 2020: RTS (21,151,206 views), TFM (474,399,127 views), ORTB (24,386,676 views), Golfe TV (131,047 views), RTI (344,731,659), NCI (7,070,691 views). All these channels offer live or replay.<\/em> Apart from formats that are reduced to capsules, the lack of diversity of expression noted on the terrestrial channel is evident on the web channel. News portals also have web TVs, as they integrated video into their editorial policy at a very early stage. They boast a high number of views: Dakaractu TV (201,858,615 views), Benin Web TV (3,371,519 views), Abidjan Net TV (111,632,314 views).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nonetheless, their content remains little diversified, with most of them reproducing the content of press publishers (Seck-Sarr, 2017). Information relating to political leaders and the people<\/em> remain highly visible. The image of ordinary people, apart from news items, is absent from the content (Abdijan.net<\/a> TV, Seneweb TV, etc.<\/em>). Most of these companies were born in the context of DTT, with production companies in Senegal (Pikini, Marodi, OkayAfrica) and C\u00f4te d'Ivoire (Scenarii.com<\/a>, Emma\u00fcs Production, etc.<\/em>) are at the forefront of online TV service audiences. Their productions (series and films), often broadcast in French (Benin and C\u00f4te d'Ivoire) or Wolof (Senegal), attempt to adopt \u00abcultural\u00bb codes, but often remain out of touch with rural realities or a little too closely modelled on the Western model. The last category concerns pure players,<\/em> Web TV channels operating exclusively on the Internet. Promoters who didn't have the privilege of being allocated a terrestrial frequency during the liberalization process or the switchover to DTT have turned to the Internet. Senegal boasts a large number of Web TVs (Senegal TV, Yes Dakar, Senegal 221, DakaractuTV, Dakar Buzz, Lelawal TV). The content of these audiovisual platforms remains very much oriented towards politics and entertainment, people<\/em> (interviews with celebrities or marabouts, reports on baptisms, weddings, funerals). In Benin, according to the network of web TV bosses (REPA-Web TV B\u00e9nin), created in January 2019, there are some forty promoters (June 2020). Among the most dynamic platforms are B\u00e9nin web TV, ESAE TV (the television of the \u00c9cole sup\u00e9rieure d'administration, d'\u00e9conomie, de journalisme et des m\u00e9tiers de l'audiovisuel), Gu\u00e9rite TV and Reporter B\u00e9nin monde. Other web TVs can be seen online: Soleil TV, Open Benin TV, Icone Web TV, Kingo TV, Awassi Web TV, R\u00e9v\u00e9lation web TV, Daabaru, Africa Sun TV. The content of these platforms is broadcast in French, and very few use local languages (with the exception of a few, such as Daabaru, which broadcasts in Dendi). In C\u00f4te d'Ivoire, the situation appears to be embryonic. Haca recently launched a census of online audiovisual media promoters, including Web TVs, Web radios and audiovisual program distribution and broadcasting services. There is every reason to believe that online television in this country will be accompanied in the spirit of benevolent regulation, as noted below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Clearly, the audiovisual landscape in French-speaking Africa has made a quantum leap in the sense of pluralism, but the content offered by online televisions does not necessarily appear to be more diversified, as summarized in the table below. The existence of a large number of television services is not in itself a guarantee of diversity of content and expression. In terms of playslists<\/em> (acting as programming and archives), the challenge of offering programming with a local reflection has not yet been met. Content, presentation and broadcasting standards are standardized, and local languages are only marginally used. Regulation focused on programming and local content could help to overcome the deficit in cultural diversity, which was more prevalent at the launch of the web TV programs studied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The regulatory provisions in force in Senegal, Benin and C\u00f4te d'Ivoire do not take sufficient account of the digital dimension of audiovisual production and broadcasting. However, the delay in issuing implementing decrees for the few provisions that have been adopted, combined with the constant evolution of digital techniques, have plunged online platforms, including web TVs, into a situation of illegality or uncertainty. Nevertheless, web TV promoters are seeking to professionalize and legitimize their online activities. Responses from regulatory authorities and industry players vary from country to country, ranging from self-regulation to hetero-regulation to co-regulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Senegal, the Coordination of Press Associations (CAP) wrote an open letter to the government, \u00abIn a context of continuous change, and at a time when the world is questioning the model for producing and distributing information [...] the regulation that will have to bring order to a sector in constant turmoil, with deviations and excesses [...]. The delays that have occurred tend to make us believe that the current state of disorder does not bother the public authorities, or better still, that it suits them\u00bb.\u00bb<\/em> (E-media,<\/em> 09 June 2020). As a result of this repeated pressure, the implementing decree for the Press Code adopted in 2017, was issued in January 2021. But the High Authority for the Regulation of Audiovisual Communication (Harca), which should propose specific specifications for the audiovisual sector and online platforms, is not yet operational. In the meantime, the minister in charge believes that it is up to the players themselves to ensure self-regulation, without \u00abwaiting for restrictions from those in power\u00bb. In fact, self-regulation can take many forms: charter, internal code of conduct, ombudsman, viewing committee. On this subject, Bernier reminds us that\u2019 \u00abHistorically, journalist self-regulation has benefited from a semantic amalgam that has had the effect of associating two different notions. Indeed, it has often been considered that there is a form of symmetry between two terms, self-regulation and self-discipline. However, freely establishing rules of conduct does not mean that we can sanction transgressions\u00bb.\u00bb<\/em> (2014). In view of the abuses noted in the practices and content of digital platforms, but also the slowness of public policies to adequately ensure the regulation of the online \u00abecosystem\u00bb, apart from the repression of infringements, the players in the online press are ensuring, in the meantime, their self-regulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Benin, as mentioned above, the Haac is criticizing the creation of online media in all directions, inviting them to suspend publication on pain of sanctions. The Haac's decision has been met with mixed reviews, especially since in 2018 it launched a call for applications to study the files of a number of online promoters. The president of REPA-web TV welcomes Haac's decision and maintains that it will make it possible to know who is a media professional or not (RFI, June 08, 2020). The option of requesting the direct intervention of the State and its institutions seems to suit Benin's web TV promoters. However, heteroregulation is at odds with the democratic tradition that recognizes press freedom and opposes any government control of information (Bernier, 2009). Indeed, the Union des professionnels des m\u00e9dias du B\u00e9nin (UPMB), through the voice of its president, sees this as a contradiction or even an obstacle to freedom of expression, and believes that HAAC's role is to regulate, not prevent, the existence of these online platforms (Ic\u00f4ne TV, June 09 2020). It's true that the lack of supervision and the excesses noted in certain broadcast content legitimize initiatives tending towards strict supervision, but the question of State intervention deserves to be asked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the regulatory debate remains latent in Benin, C\u00f4te d'Ivoire's Haca and the R\u00e9seau des professionnels de la presse en ligne de la C\u00f4te d'Ivoire (REPPLELCI) have jointly initiated a census of digital media and online audiovisual media promoters. They recommend a priori<\/em> co-regulation, a combination of self-regulation and heteroregulation. According to Bernier, a co-regulation model \u00abCo-regulation\u00bb is only legitimate in a context of the rule of law, where the law is administered by independent judges, appointed for their competence and free from government pressure. Without these conditions, co-regulation cannot be democratic. It can even become authoritarian and repressive.\u00bb<\/em> (Bernier, 2009). These diversified approaches to regulation demonstrate the need for African countries to avoid imposing an imported model in response to the challenges of diversity and sovereignty posed by the combined effects of international pressure and national political control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A politico-legal analysis of audiovisual regulations in Benin, C\u00f4te d'Ivoire and Senegal, on the one hand, and an exploration of public and private online television media, on the other, indicate that online television in these countries, despite its remarkable progress over the last five years, is not yet varied in terms of titles and languages, nor yet balanced in terms of the themes covered. To better understand the limits of national regulations, online TV was first situated in its international geopolitical context. In this context of cultural domination, the African countries examined have not demonstrated their ability to meet the challenges of the digital switchover through consistent regulation. They are more concerned with controlling content than promoting diversity and defending national sovereignty. They see emerging online television as a threat to their internal authority, deserving repressive and dissuasive regulation, instead of seeing it as an opportunity to exploit its enormous potential, to better position themselves in a television landscape strongly shaped by North-South relations of domination and content competition. This competition is all the more exacerbated by the fact that it is now played out on a global scale, sparing no country. The web giants, in this case Facebook and Google, have positioned themselves in the broadcasting of audiovisual media on Netflix, according to the famous report Internet Trends<\/em> by Mary Meeker (Frenchweb,fr, 2019). The television industry is lagging far behind in its migration to the Internet. But it is undergoing profound change in terms of production, broadcasting and consumption, even in developed countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, the imbalance in cultural industries and international information flows that gave rise to the Nomic debate in the 1970s has become an intra-Western issue since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a reminder, in the face of the economic and cultural hegemony of the United States, France and the European Union joined forces with Quebec and Canada to lead UNESCO to adopt the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in Paris on October 20, 2005. In its preamble, this convention affirms, among other things, that \u00abfreedom of thought, expression and information, as well as diversity of the media, allow cultural expressions to flourish within societies\u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the French-speaking world, the audiovisual landscape of the group of countries that might be called the \u00abQuartet de la Francophonie\u00bb (France, F\u00e9d\u00e9ration Wallonie-Bruxelles-Belgique, Switzerland and Quebec-Canada), shows a policy of diversifying and promoting local, national and regional terrestrial online channels, as well as developing web TV (CSA Belgium, 2017), within the limits of intellectual property rights (Madiega, 2019). Despite their measures to protect and promote local content, the Quartet still feels fragile from the point of view of digital geopolitics and diversity. For this reason, France was considering a far-reaching reform of its audiovisual sector legislation to face up to competition from powerful foreign groups such as Netflix, Apple, Amazon, Disney and Warner, etc.<\/em> to assert its cultural sovereignty in this field[5]<\/a>. Lecler reminds us that \u00abFaced with American domination, France has launched a policy of counter-globalization, relying on the diplomacy of cultural diversity rather than the international box-office. It turned to other countries dominated by audiovisual globalization, such as the French-speaking countries associated with TV5\u00bb.\u00bb<\/em> (Lecler, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n If France is protecting itself against the American giants, the countries of French-speaking Africa can also protect themselves against the giants of the French-speaking world. The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity recognizes the \u00absovereign right of all States to adopt measures and policies to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions within their territory\u00bb (articles 2-2 and 5). With this in mind, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Uemoa) had adopted, in its Directive no. 1\/2015 on digital terrestrial television, measures to control foreign investment (art. 9), support local production and impose a minimum quota of 40% for broadcasting national or community content (art. 10). This directive should inspire the regulation of online television, in a spirit of mobilization of national television players and partnership with international platforms and media. Further research is needed to highlight the link between public policy, producer responsibility and online content diversity, in an international context marked by cultural domination and media concentration.<\/p>\n\n\n\nAfrica and the geopolitics of the international media<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
The international media rush to Africa<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Regulating online television in West Africa<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Regulation of online television in Benin<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Strict regulation of online television in Senegal<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Accompanying regulation for online television in C\u00f4te d'Ivoire<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Limited diversity of online TV media in West Africa<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Real pluralism and limited diversity in online television<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Summary table of online media content observation<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
<div> <body> <div class="”page”"> <table> <tbody> <tr> <th>Country<\/th> <th>Number of videos<\/th> <th>TV channels<\/th> <th>Main themes<\/th> <th>Languages<\/th> <th>Religions<\/th> <th>Ethnic minorities<\/th> <\/tr> <tr> <td>Senegal<\/td> <td>10 259<\/td> <td>RTS<\/td> <td>Politics and culture<\/td> <td>Wolof, French and national languages<\/td> <td>Visible<\/td> <td>Represented<\/td> <\/tr> <tr> <td><\/td> <td>45 992<\/td> <td>TFM<\/td> <td>Politics and entertainment<\/td> <td>French, Wo-Lof and Pulaar<\/td> <td>Visible<\/td> <td>Little represented<\/td> <\/tr> <tr> <td><\/td> <td>25 441<\/td> <td>Dakarac- m<\/td> <td>Politics, sport and religion<\/td> <td>French, Wolof<\/td> <td>Visible<\/td> <td>Ignored<\/td> <\/tr> <tr> <td>Benin<\/td> <td>23 939<\/td> <td>ORTB<\/td> <td>Politics, culture, economics<\/td> <td>French and native languages<\/td> <td>Visible<\/td> <td>Represented<\/td> <\/tr> <tr> <td><\/td> <td>382<\/td> <td>Golfe TV<\/td> <td>Culture, politics<\/td> <td>French<\/td> <td>Not very visible<\/td> <td>Little represented<\/td> <\/tr> <tr> <td><\/td> <td>1 630<\/td> <td>Benin Web TV<\/td> <td>Policy<\/td> <td>French<\/td> <td>Visible<\/td> <td>Little represented<\/td> <\/tr> <tr> <td>Ivory Coast<\/td> <td>57867<\/td> <td>RTI<\/td> <td>Politics and culture<\/td> <td>French<\/td> <td>Visible<\/td> <td>No information<\/td> <\/tr> <tr> <td><\/td> <td>1 620<\/td> <td>NCI<\/td> <td>Culture and di- vertissement<\/td> <td>French<\/td> <td>Not very visible<\/td> <td>No information<\/td> <\/tr> <tr> <td><\/td> <td>16 822<\/td> <td>Abidjan Net TV<\/td> <td>Politics and news<\/td> <td>French<\/td> <td>Not very visible<\/td> <td>No information<\/td> <\/tr> <\/tbody> <\/table> <\/div> <\/body> <\/div><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Regulation, heteroregulation or coregulation of online television<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
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